Image may contain: car and outdoor
Weyman Cochran

Funny things started to happen quick … After the shop put it on, I went to take a picture (grabbed the wrong phone, it was dead) I heard a horn blow, looked and a deputy was driving by (oh boy), came back out from paying, and the deputy was pulling up, then he backed up and wrote something down then pulled back up … (oh boy, the only thing to do is go flush, DAMN IT!)
Ok, can’t sit here all day, so I backed around so he could see the back, as I pulled away I looked back and he was looking, grinning, and he waved! Ok, BREATHING….went about 4 miles then poof, got another behind me, he followed about 2 miles then passed me in a hurry …. My nerves are shot! Later I traveled to my daughter’s but spotted a roadblock …YES, I DIPPED OUT!
I’ve already had a heart attack and enough stress for one day!

But I’m ready …


County of Baldwin
State of Georgia

Notice to the principal is notice to the agent 
Notice to the agent is notice to the principal

Be it known to all that I, Weyman P Cochran, own a 1994 Toyota Camry                      Vin #JT2GK12E4R0015601, it is private property personal effects, consumer goods, not equipment. As per UCC 9-109 (1)

Under USC Title 42 §1982. Property rights of citizens …, further evidences the above position that the City or State cannot take land because DOES NOT have Jurisdiction. It states that federal or state governments/agencies MUST have a monetary or proprietary interest in your real private property in order to have jurisdiction over it (if your land has no government grant/funding or is not a subsidized government project, then agencies have neither). DEMAND any public servant/said agencies to provide the legal document that allows any federal or state agency to supersede and/or bypass Title 42 USC §1982 and/or §1441. Title 42 §1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights …., further protects Declarant’s private property.

“… In one of the so-called elevator cases, that of Munn v. Illinois, 
94 U. S. 113, [24 L. Ed. 77], it is said: ‘When, therefore, one devotes 
his property to a use in which the public have an interest, he in                              effect grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to 
be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the 
interest he has thus created.’ But so long as he uses his property for 
private use, and in the absence of devoting it to public use, the 
public has no interest therein which entitles it to a voice in its 

“The use to which an item is put, rather than its physical characteristics, 
determine whether it should be classified as “consumer goods” under UCC 9-109(1) or “equipment” under UCC 9-109(2).” Grimes v Massey Ferguson, Inc., 23 UCC Rep Serv 655; 355 So.2d 338 (Ala., 1978).

“Under UCC 9-109 there is a real distinction between goods purchased for personal use and those purchased for business use. The two are mutually exclusive and the principal use to which the property is put should be considered as determinative.” James Talcott, Inc. v Gee, 5 UCC Rep Serv 1028; 266 Cal.App.2d 384, 72 Cal.Rptr. 168 (1968).

“The classification of goods in UCC 9-109 are mutually exclusive.” McFadden 
v Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 8 UCC Rep Serv 766; 260 Md 601, 273 
A.2d 198 (1971).

“Men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, – ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;’ and to ‘secure,’ not grant or create, these rights, governments are instituted.

That property which a man has honestly acquired he retains full control of, subject to these limitations: first, that he shall not use it to his neighbor’s injury, and that does not mean that he must use it for his neighbor’s benefit: second, that if he devotes it to a public use, he gives to the public a right to control that use; and third, that whenever the public needs require, the public may take it upon payment of due compensation Budd v. People of State of New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892).

“Thus self-driven vehicles are classified according to the use to which they are put rather than according to the means by which they are propelled Ex Parte Hoffert, 148 NW 20. And;

“In view of this rule a statutory provision that the supervising officials “may”
exempt such persons when the transportation is not on a commercial basis 
means that they “must” exempt them.” State v. Johnson, 243 P. 1073; 6 C.J.S. section 94 page 581.

As far as having it registered …

“A vehicle not used for commercial activity is a “consumer goods”, …it is NOT a vehicle that is REQUIRED to be REGISTERED under this code “Passenger vehicles which are not used for the transportation of persons for hire, compensation or profit, and house cars, are not commercial vehicles”, “a vanpool vehicle is not a commercial vehicle” and; NOT the type of vehicle required to be registered and “use tax” paid of which the tab is evidence of receipt of the tax.” Bank of Boston vs Jones, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 1021, 236 A2d 484, UCC PP 9-109.14. And;

“It is held that a tax upon common carriers by motor vehicles is based upon a by reasonable classification, and does not involve any unconstitutional discrimination, although it does not apply to private vehicles, or those used the owner in his own business, and not for hire.” Desser v. Wichita, (1915) 96 Kan. 820; Iowa Motor Vehicle Asso. v. Railroad Comrs., 75 A.L.R. 22.

What must happen …

In view of this rule, a statutory provision that the supervising officials “may” exempt such persons when the transportation is not on a commercial basis means that they “must” exempt them. State v. Johnson, 243 P. 1073; 6 C.J.S. section 94 page 581.

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this the _____ day of _______ in the year __________ by

Weyman Paul Cochran 


My commission expires ___________


    CAUTION: see also this article:



This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink.